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Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: 
A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial 
Speech 
Rodney A. Smolla * 
I. Introduction 
In their provocative essay, Commerce & Communication,1 Professors 
Ronald K.L. Collins and David M. Skover invite us to re-examine First 
Amendment doctrines concerning commercial speech in light of the realities 
of modern mass advertising in contemporary American culture. 
Collins and Skover argue that the "logic of discourse" changes as 
modern advertising becomes less concerned with conveying information 
about products and more concerned with conveying image and fantasy.2 
This "debases" the normative values once associated with our cultural 
images and symbols, and actually alters the identity of the consumer, who 
comes to believe that products are invested with miraculous fetish-like 
powers. 3 Powerful advertisers can reshape the media in their own image, 
encouraging a "discourse in the service of waste" and turning what was 
once a "citizen-democracy" into a "consumer-democracy. "4 Political 
leaders in turn mimic the strategies of advertisers, further blurring the line 
between political and commercial discourse. 5 
In this Response I take issue with the striking claims advanced by 
Collins and Skover concerning the nature of modern advertising and its 
impact on American culture. I argue that the threats to public discourse 
posed by contemporary mass advertising are largely exaggerated. 
In determining whether it is appropriate to adopt a First Amendment 
regime in which society is given the license to regulate heavily the content 
* Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, and Director, Institute of Bill of Rights Law, College of 
William and Mary, Marshall-Wythe School of Law. B.A. 1975, Yale University; J.D. 1978, Duke 
University. 
1. Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce&: Communication, 71 TEx. L. REv. 697 
(1993). 
2. /d. at 710. 
3. /d. 
4. /d. at 711. 
5. /d. 
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of commercial speech, it is obviously important to assess how much harm 
modem advertising really causes. 6 While I think that the basic descriptive 
portrait of contemporary advertising drawn by Collins and Skover is 
realistic, their accounting of the harm caused by such advertising is more 
a caricature of modem American life than a persuasive analysis. Their 
portrait is, to be sure, an arresting caricature-and like all good caricature, 
it draws cleverly from reality-but they fail to demonstrate that contempo-
rary mass advertising really causes much palpable social harm; that any 
plausible new regime of commercial speech regulation would elevate Amer-
ican public discourse; or that such a regulatory regime would improve the 
conditions of American society, let alone be reconcilable with the core 
traditions of the First Amendment. 
I wish to concentrate on three of the themes most central to the argu-
ments advanced by Collins and Skover. The first theme is the Collins and 
Skover vision of the marketplace of ideas. Much of their indictment of 
mass advertising in my judgment is grounded in a vision of an ideal mar-
ketplace in which parties trade reliable and useful information in order to 
facilitate rational decisionmaking. As wonderful as this ideal sounds, is it 
a plausible aspiration for a marketplace in a truly open society? Can it be 
squared with the assumptions that currently govern (and I think should 
govern) modem First Amendment jurisprudence?7 The second theme 
focuses on the influence of modem mass advertising on the values of the 
national community and the motifs of public discourse. Are the vexing 
problems of current American life really caused, in any demonstrable way, 
by modem commercial advertising? Or are cause and effect far more 
jumbled and inscrutable, so that the "sound bites" of modem political 
discourse and the "image bites" of contemporary advertising do not so 
much reflect a linear physics in which one "causes" the other as much as 
they both reflect the larger influencing patterns of contemporary culture?8 
The third theme focuses on the impact modem mass advertising has on 
individual consumers. Are we as individuals really shaped, in any deep 
and profound sense, by modem advertising? Are we in modem times 
really just "the sum of what we buy"?9 
ll. Advertising and the Current State of the Marketplace of Ideas 
A. The First Amendment and Competing Visions of the "Marketplace" 
Claims that commercial speech is undeserving of full-or perhaps of 
any-First Amendment protection are usually grounded in the judgment 
6. Or, it might be said, to ask critically and skeptically, "Where's the Beef?" q: id. at 726. 
7. See infra Part II. 
8. See infra subpart ill(B). 
9. See infra subpart ill(C). 
1993] A Case for Expansive Protection 779 
that commercial speech does not fulfill any of the functions traditionally 
advanced to justify the fact that we give heightened constitutional protection 
to speech at all. Thus, if one sees freedom of speech primarily as an aid 
to democratic self-governance, 10 commercial speech is likely to be left out 
in the cold because it does not in any obvious or direct way appear to 
advance the processes of democracy .11 If one sees freedom of speech 
primarily as a vehicle for individual autonomy and self-fulfillment, 
commercial speech-at least when "spoken" through the artificial voices of 
inanimate corporations-does not seem to qualify as speech that lifts the 
human spirit of the speaker.12 And if the oldest of free speech metaphors, 
"the marketplace of ideas, "13 is one's primary justification for enhanced 
protection of speech, commercial speech again falls short because its 
content seems largely devoid of anything that ought properly be called an 
"idea," or as Collins and Skover maintain, much that can honestly be 
described as "information. "14 
Collins and Skover do not offer either a satisfactory definition of 
commercial speech or a convincing explanation of why it should not 
receive the same high level of constitutional protection routinely granted 
to other genres of speech. Indeed, they turn classic First Amendment 
thinking upside down. Their argument is pervaded by the theme that 
commercial speech must earn its way into constitutional protection by 
offering something of value in its content. The only plausible value they 
appear to credit is the "informational" content of commercial speech, 
10. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47IND. L.J. 
1, 20 (1971) (arguing that speech occupies a central role in maintaining democratic institutions). 
11. See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the 
Substance and limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299, 353-54 (1978) (arguing against protection 
for commercial speech because it bears no relation to processes of politics and public decisionmaking); 
Thomas H. Jackson& John C. Jeffries, Jr., Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First 
Amendment, 65 VA. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1979) ("[T]he first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech 
and press protects only certain identifiable values. Chief among them is effective self-government. 
Additionally, the first amendment may protect the opportunity for individual self-fulfillment through 
free expression. Neither value is implicated by governmental regulation of commercial speech."). 
12. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 196 {1989) {claiming that 
commercial speech lacks "crucial connections with individual liberty and self-realization"); C. Edwin 
Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REv. 1, 3 (1976) 
("(C]ommercial speech is not a manifestation of individual freedom or choice; unlike the broad 
categories of protected speech, commercial speech does not represent an attempt to create or affect the 
world in a way which can be expected to represent anyone's private or personal wishes."). 
13. See generally Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKELJ. 
1, 6-16 (explaining the history of the marketplace model in constitutional law and examining the 
model's assumptions). 
14. See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 729-33. For a powerful critique of the argument that 
commercial speech does not contribute to traditional free speech values, see Steven Shiffrin, The First 
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. 
U. L. REv. 1212, 1223-51 (1983). 
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content that will assist consumers in making informed and rational choices 
in the marketplace. 15 
I would, however, approach the matter from the other direction. 
Commercial speech, as speech, should presumptively enter the debate with 
full First Amendment protection.16 The theoretical question should not 
be what qualifies commercial speech for First Amendment coverage, but 
what, if anything, disqualifies it. In my view, there are no convincing 
arguments for disqualifying most modem mass advertising from constitu-
tional protection. The argument for even reducing the level of protection 
to the intermediate standard of review granted by existing First Amendment 
doctrine is theoretically sound only if applied to a limited subclass of 
advertising: that subclass of advertising that does "no more than propose 
a commercial transaction. "17 
It is only the linkage between commercial speech and a commercial 
transaction that gives government the theoretical leverage to presume to 
regulate the speech at all.18 Because government has virtually unchecked 
constitutional power to regulate transactions, 19 government may legiti-
mately claim some special prerogative to regulate speech about trans-
actions.20 In classic First Amendment terms, however, the one thing the 
15. See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 730 (quoting Daniel H. Lowenstein, •roo Much Puff': 
Persuasion, Paternalism and Commercial Speech, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1205, 1228-29 (1988)). 
16. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, Revitalizing the Clear-and-Present-Danger Test: Toward a Principled 
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 22 VILL. L. REV. 60, 69-70 (1977) (arguing in favor of 
protecting all speech under rigorous heightened review standards, without regard to categories such as 
"commercial speech" or "libel"). The Supreme Court's decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 
S. Ct. 2538 (1992), certainly supports this proposition. For a further discussion of R.A. V., see infra 
notes 43-55 and accompanying text. 
17. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
762 (1976) (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 
385 (1973), and holding that such speech does not lack First Amendment protection) (emphasis added). 
18. See Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 
374 (1979) ("[T]he commercial subject matter of the advertisement forms the basis of the government's 
claim to regulatory power."). 
19. See Kenneth S. Weitzman, Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution: Does Congress 
Have the Authority to Abrogate State Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity After Pennsylvania v. 
Union Gas Co.?, 2 SETON HALL CoNsr. L.J. 297, 333 (1991) ("Pursuant to the commerce clause, 
congressional authority is extremely broad, if not virtually unlimited today, and nearly anything even 
remotely connected with interstate commerce is subject to Congress' plenary powers."). 
20. A good illustration of the appropriate regulation of commercial speech as an incident to the 
regulation of underlying transactions is provided by the pattern of Supreme Court cases involving 
attorney advertising and solicitation. The Court has generally struck down efforts by states to restrict 
attorney advertising. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (invalidating 
state prohibitions against targeted, direct-mail advertising by attorneys); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 
(1982) (holding that states may not limit the terms attorneys use to advertise their services as long as 
the terms used are not deceptive); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that the First 
Amendment gives lawyers the right to advertise the prices of routine services, such as simple real estate 
closings, uncontested divorces, uncontested adoptions, or personal bankruptcies). But in Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), the Court sustained a disciplinsry action against an 
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government may not do is regulate speech because it "sells" a lifestyle, 
fantasy, ethos, identity, or attitude that happens to be regarded by most as 
socially corrosive. 21 
To the extent that advertisers are selling fantasies, lifestyles, identity, 
or anything other than "hard core" transactional information, they are 
doing what all other speakers routinely do. They are making these points, 
to be sure, out of utter self-interest; indeed, out of the most grasping of all 
forms of self-interest-the desire for financial profit. But the profit motive 
attorney for an in-person solicitation of a client in a hospital following an accident. Although the 
solicitation did involve speech, the Court made it clear that its amendment decisions upholding the 
rights oflawyers to advertise did not strip bar authorities of the power to regulate the type of potentially 
abusive behavior at issue in the in-person solicitation context. The decision in Ohralik stood in contrast 
to In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), decided the same day as Ohralik, in which the Court upheld the 
First Amendment right of a lawyer to make a written communication of free legal assistance provided 
by lawyers with the ACLU, not in anticipation of a personal pecuniary gain, but rather in an effort to 
express personal political beliefs and to advance the civil liberties objectives of the ACLU. 
21. At the core of modem First Amendment jurisprudence lies the elemental proposition that 
regulation of speech expressing an intent to stifle a message because of disagreement with it simply 
cannot be reconciled with the Constitution. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 
2548 (1992); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 319 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 
414 (1989); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal 
Defense& Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985); Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers 
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984); Bolgerv. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983); 
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 
u.s. 455, 462-63 (1980). 
Perhaps the two cases that come closest to supporting the type of commercial speech regulation 
apparently contemplated by Collins and Skover are Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co., 
478 U.S. 328 (1986), and Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981). But even 
these decisions do not support the sweeping regulation of commercial speech that the Collins and 
Skoverthesis seems to invite. In Posadas, for example, the government of Puerto Rico was concerned 
by the social evils caused by casino gambling. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 332. As described by the Court, 
the legislature enacted a statute and regulations "restricting advertising of casino gambling aimed at the 
residents of Puerto Rico," id. at 330, based on the belief that "[e]xcessive casino gambling among local 
residents ••• would produce serious harmful effects on the health, safety and welfare of the Puerto 
Rican citizens, such as the disruption of moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local crime, the 
fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption, and the infiltration of organized crime." ld. 
at 341 (quoting Brief for Appellees at 37). By permitting casinos to target their advertising to tourists 
from outside the Commomwealth but not to the Puerto Rican population, the government sought to 
discourage gambling by its own citizens. Id. at 335. Applying the commercial speech standard, the 
Supreme Court had no difficulty finding Puerto Rico's interests "substantial" and its mechanism 
sufficiently well-tailored to vindicate those interests. Id. at 341. 
Similarly, in Metromedia, the City of San Diego did not seek to eliminate commercial billboard 
advertising because of the content of the advertisements, but because of the "visual clutter" and safety 
hazards caused by the physical presence of billboards on the landscape. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 
493 (identifying the City's interests as the elimination of "hazards to pedestrians and motorists" and 
the preservation and improvement of the city's appearance). Cases such as Posadas and Metromedia 
thus do not stand for the proposition that government may legislate at will upon commercial speech, 
drawing whatever distinctions it pleases. Rather, they stand for the proposition that when legislation 
is backed by truly substantial governmental interests, such as the perceived social evils of gambling or 
the environmental and aesthetic damage caused by billboards, commercial speech may be forced to 
yield. 
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alone is not enough, either in First Amendment doctrine or theory, to 
disqualify speech from full constitutional protection. 22 
The very "excesses" of modern advertising that might at first make it 
seem a likely candidate for heavy legal regulation are actually the attributes 
that most qualify such speech for the heightened constitutional protection 
we routinely grant other categories of speech.23 Indeed, the distinction 
that is central to the Collins and Skover argument, a distinction that seeks 
to drive a wedge between the rational and irrational components of adver-
tising,24 is one that has been repudiated in virtually all other areas of 
current First Amendment doctrine. 25 The refusal of current First Amend-
ment jurisprudence to accept a schism between the rational and irrational 
elements of speech (or, to use slightly different terms, between the 
intellectual and emotional content of speech) is sound-indeed, I would say 
vital to the American conception of freedom of speech.26 Commercial 
speech should be no exception.27 
22. The Supreme Court has noted this point on several occasions. In Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, 
stated: "[S]peech does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is spent to project it, 
as in a paid advertisement of one form or another. . • • Speech likewise is protected even though it 
is carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (citation omitted); see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. 
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384-85 (1973); New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, ISO (1959); Joseph Burstyn, 
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943); see 
also MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 64 (1984) (arguing that 
commercial speech may not be distinguished from political speech on the ground that the former must 
be hardier because of its underlying profit motive). 
23. See Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 16 VA. L. REv. 
627, 652 (1990) (arguing that the ability to exchange commercial information may be more important 
than political or artistic expression since one's livelihood may depend upon effective commercial 
speech). 
24. See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 702-05. 
25. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 46-47 (1992). 
26. In its famous decision in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the Court explained the 
"dual communicative function" of many forms of free expression: 
[M]uch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only 
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible 
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their 
cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the 
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function 
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall 
message sought to be communicated. 
Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one can 
forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the 
process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words 
as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views. 
Id. at 26. 
27. Cf. Burt Neubome,A Rationale for Protecting and Regulating Commercial Speech, 46 BROOK. 
L. REv. 437, 448-53 (1980) (arguing that commercial speech deserves greater protection than it 
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The baggage carried by commercial speech is the bias of the intelli-
gentsia. That segment of American culture that lives for a life of the mind, 
and indeed makes a living by living for the life of the mind, will naturally 
harbor some disdain for the coarser entries in the marketplace of ideas-
those ideas that sell only goods and services. 28 
To the intellectual or the academic, speech that is rational, analytic, 
and contemplative will usually receive higher marks than speech that 
appeals to passion and prejudice. When the passion or prejudice is 
attached to some intellectual supposition, some academic minds, of course, 
may be comfortable granting it some measure of merit. The creative 
passions of the playwright, poet, musician, or artist will be treated by most 
academics as deserving the same freedom from censorship as the denser 
thought of the analytic philosopher or particle physicist. But when the 
passion is attached only to a product, when an effort is made to short-
circuit the brain, discard Consumer Reports, and get people to buy 
something by engaging them in fantasies about their own personas and 
lifestyles, the academic is likely to be intolerant. For this crass speech 
does not appear to be any part of the "exposition of ideas, "29 nor con-
nected in any plausible manner to the pursuit of "truth, science, morality, 
and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments. "30 
This judgment, however, itself reflects a bias that is undemocratic and 
intellectually elitist. It is not so much an upper-class bias or leisure-class 
currently receives to ensure that data necessary for economic and political decisionmaking is available); 
Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free 
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429, 431 (1971) (arguing that certain commercial speech, such 
as informational and artistic advertising, should receive protection); Ronald D. Rotunda, The 
Commercial Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1080 (agreeing with the result 
of a recent Supreme Court case that seemed to reject a notion of affording a different protection for 
commercial speech and arguing that the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech is 
untenable and unwise). 
28. See R.H. Coase, The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas, 64 AM. EcoN. REv. 384 
(1974). Coase observes: 
"Everyone tends to magnify the importance of his own occupation and to minimize that 
of his neighbor. Intellectuals are engaged in the pursuit of truth, while others are merely 
engaged in earning a livelihood. One follows a profession, usually a learned one, while 
the other follows a trade or a business." 1 would put the point more bluntly. The market 
for ideas is the market in which the intellectual conducts his trade. The explanation of 
the paradox is self-interest and self-esteem. Self-esteem leads the intellectuals to magnify 
the importance of their own market. 
Id. at 386 (quoting Aaron Director, The Parity of the Economic Market Place, 7 J.L. & EcON. 1, 7 
(1964)). 
29. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). ln Chaplinsky, the Court noted 
that obscene, profane, libelous, and fighting words-words that have no social value-are "no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas" and thus do not merit First Amendment protection. /d. 
30. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). Quoting from 1 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 108 (Johnson Reprinting Corp. 1968) (1774), the Roth Court stated that one 
function of freedom of the press is to advance these ideas. I d. 
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bias as it is a vocational bias, a bias likely to be found in many academics 
and others who live by and for words and ideas. I am part of that 
vocational class and I share the bias, a bias that often looks with disdain 
upon much of mass culture-mass commercial culture~ mass political 
culture, mass entertainment culture, mass journalistic culture.l1 
But what follows from this bias? In an open democracy, can it be that 
intellectuals have a mandate to push government to regulate mass culture 
in the service of elevating it? Or should we who pride ourselves on living 
in the "real" marketplace of ideas demonstrate the democratic liberality that 
the marketplace metaphor really stands for, and understand that mass 
culture will always be with us? 
Mass culture will always dominate a democracy, and elite culture 
could not live without it. Elite culture ultimately feeds off of mass culture, 
using it for energy and fodder, seeking to transform and reform, for it is 
the raw stuff of social life from which novels, poems, plays, and law 
review articles criticizing mass advertising all ultimately come. 
Many facets of modern public discourse are fatuous and vacuous. The 
classic First Amendment response of Louis Brandeis-that "the fitting 
remedy for evil counsels is good ones, "32-also supplies the best cultural 
response. The fitting remedy for shoddy thought is quality thought. If 
those who disdain mass culture want to do the world a favor, then write 
better books and articles, produce better plays and movies, design better 
scientific experiments and cures, do more thoughtful and penetrating 
journalism, and certainly continue to wage attack on all in the world of 
public discourse-political, artistic, scientific, and commercial-that is 
substandard.33 But do not ask government to bring to bear the force of 
law to set standards of quality. 
Modern lifestyle advertising certainly does not match the idealized 
marketplace of ideas posited by Professors Collins and Skover.34 Mass 
31. 1 do not wish to preach. Like many of my colleagues, I too have a reflexive distaste for many 
of the silly and seductive commercials invented by modem advertisers, particularly those that appeal 
to our darker impulses. Like many of my colleagues, I have no use for 30-second political spots that 
sell candidates like cologne or for 30-minute political speeches that do little but soar to higher and 
higher platitudes. Like many of my colleagues, I often find it hard to find engaging entertainment on 
television and prefer to get my news and analysis from National Public Radio than from Inside Edition. 
It is one thing to share these preferences; it is quite another, however, to believe that one is entitled 
to see them enacted into law. 
32. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
33. Cf. Robert C. Post, 7he Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
DemocraticDeliberationandHustierMagazinev. Falwell, 103 HAR.v. L. REv. 601,684 (1990) ("The 
first amendment preserves the independence of public discourse so that a democratic will within a 
culturally heterogeneous state can emerge under conditions of neutrality, and so that individuals can 
use the medium of public discourse to persuade others to experiment in new forms of community 
life."). 
34. See Collins & Skover, supra note I, at 698 (contrasting "the ideal marketplace, [in which] 
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market, lifestyle advertising is a far cry from the pristine, informational 
advertising of the want ads or the Yellow Pages. But whether this is a 
failure of the real to match the ideal depends on what one's ideal was in 
the first place. 
Perhaps some believe that the "ideal" marketplace really would be one 
in which serious propositions of politics, policy, or philosophy are debated 
rationally, with the order and decorum of a meeting conducted under 
Robert's Rules. But the ideal marketplace could just as well be a cacoph-
ony rather than a symphony, in which all means of persuasion-gentle and 
harsh, logical and emotional, rational and irrational-vie with one another 
in an open bazaar of politicians, peddlers, proselytizers, panhandlers, and 
petitioners, all hawking their wares in a booming, buzzing confusion. 
If one's notion of the value of the marketplace metaphor is that the 
market will actually produce truth, or even is the best test of truth, it is not 
so difficult a jump to favor at least moderate forms of market regulation so 
as to help truth along a bit, at least by ridding the market of that which 
cannot even articulate any conceivable claim to be advancing the pursuit of 
truth. Perhaps because Oliver Wendell Holmes used the words "test" and 
"truth" and "experiment" in his wonderful dissent in Abrams v. United 
States, 35 we tend to think of the marketplace of ideas in this "scientific 
hypothesis" sense, in which ideas vie with one another in a grinding 
historical process of examination and cross-examination, with the ideas at 
the top of the heap reflecting the best market judgment at any given 
moment of where truth lies. 
But this notion of the marketplace is actually not what a real 
marketplace looks like at all. It is the variety of the real marketplace that 
gives it its excitement and color and life and quality. It is all the different 
fruits and vegetables and fish and foul piled up on iced carts in the 
farmers' markets ofthe plazas of the world's cities, all the different stocks 
traded on the stock exchanges, all the different compact disks and cassette 
tapes stacked in the giant record store, all the different books and maga-
zines crowded into a great bookstore, and yes, all the microwave ovens, 
lawn mowers, athletic shoes, soft-drink cans, sweatshirts, and bicycles 
hung and heaped willy-nilly in the Wal-Mart, that compose all of these 
individual markets, and the mass market that holds them all. 
Let the buyer beware! This is a market filled with hucksters, hustlers, 
there is a 'free trade in ideas'" with the current marketplace, which is "a marketplace of commercial 
symbols" (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 660 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis in original)). 
35. 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Justice Holmes argued that "the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the 
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market • • • • [Our Constitution] is an 
experiment, as all life is an experiment." I d. 
786 Texas Law Review [Vol. 71:777 
hype, and hyperbole. In an open society, the gullible will often be seduced 
by the catch-phrases of billionaire populists and billion-dollar ad cam-
paigns. In an open society there is always pressure to believe that money 
and material will give life meaning. The very openneSs, however, that 
invites a Ross Perot to hint a run for the presidency and instantly garner 
a third of the potential vote, or that encourages advertisers to try to make 
us all materialists, will also give free wheel to the intellectual and 
entrepreneurial imaginations that hold the best promise for genuinely 
uplifting our quality of life. 
B. Advertising, Public Discourse, and the Futility of Attempting to 
Elevate the Market Through Regulation 
There is, concededly, a haunting verisimilitude to the claim that mass 
advertising does, in a diffused and collective sense, transform the culture, 
degrading the quality of all our ambient public discourse. Collins and 
Skover are most persuasive when pointing out that the commercial 
exploitation of the symbols and images of noncommercial culture is 
parasitic and tends to trivialize, dilute, and debase those symbols.36 
Collins and Skover are on far weaker ground, however, when they 
intimate that regnlation is the answer to this problem. Regulating the 
marketplace on these grounds clearly cannot be squared with the assump-
tions underlying modern First Amendment theory. 37 But even if Collins 
and Skover choose not to accept those First Amendment assumptions-and 
they are of course free to urge that those assumptions be discarded-
presuming to regulate mass advertising in order to defend high culture or 
to elevate public discourse is misguided social policy. 
Collins and Skover use the American flag as a primary example of the 
debasement of cultural symbols through commercial exploitation, noting 
that "Betsy Ross's 'Old Glory' is waved constantly in hawking everything 
from clothes to cakes, "38 and asking: "Why should the ideal of the flag 
(raised at Iwo Jima) be the stock-in-trade of jean and pastry ads? Do we 
not risk debasing the symbol of American sacrifice by these associa-
tions?"39 
I accept that any use of the flag is likely to have symbolic signifi-
cance, and that in the eyes of many, to use it to sell jeans or burn it to 
express exasperation with the Republican Party is to debase it. But the flag 
is not Betsy Ross's, nor the government's, nor the culture's, to shelter. 
The short answer to Collins and Skover is that the First Amendment 
36. See Collins & Skover, supra note I, at 709-10. 
37. See supra notes '23-27 and infra notes 43-55, and accompanying text. 
38. Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 711. 
39. Id. at 713. 
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protects this type of symbolic debasement.40 The long answer is that it 
should. 
To help make the case against commercial speech, Collins and Skover 
note that the "mass advertising process takes from the culture, transforms 
what it takes, and then tenders back what it took and transformed. "41 But 
this process is not unique to mass advertising. It is, rather, what virtually 
all creative expression does all the time. This is precisely the interpretative 
transformation that takes place in great art and literature. Thus, the 
transforming process is not itself the evil. It is not the transforming of 
reality or the manipulation of cultural symbols and images tllat is bad; 
rather, it is the quality of the transformation that offends Collins and 
Skover. There is good art and there is schlock. There is "exploitation" 
of reality for the high artistic purpose of illuminating the human condition, 
and there is "exploitation" to make a fast buck. As far as the First 
Amendment is concerned, however, unless this transforming speech vio-
lates some legally cognizable interest, such as copyright protection or an 
invasion of personal privacy or reputation, all of this exploitation is 
protected. 42 
The Supreme Court recently dramatically reinforced the First Amend-
40. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (striking down the Federal Flag Protection 
Act, Congress's response to Johnson, infra, because ofits implicit <;ontentrestriction on speech); Texas 
v. J"ohnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (overturning a conviction for flag desecration on the ground that 
symbolic dissent is protected by the First Amendment). 
41. Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 708. 
42. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York 
State Crime Victims Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991), illustrates how the current Court will view attempts 
to regulate speech on the basis of its content, even when the exploitative potential of the speech is quite 
vivid. In a unanimous decision, the Simon&: Schuster Court struck down New York's Son of Sam 
law. N.Y. ExEc. LAw§ 632-a (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1992). The law required that an accused 
or convicted criminal's income from works describing his crime be deposited in an escrow account; 
the funds were to be made available to the victims of the crime and the criminal's other creditors. Id. 
J"ustice O'Connor, writing for the majority, struck down the statute and powerfully condemned content-
based restrictions on speech. She stated: "A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First 
Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech." Simon 
&: Schuster, 112 S. Ct. at 508. The Court cautioned that "it bears repeating" that "[i]n the context of 
financial regulation ••• the Government's ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the 
specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace." 
Id. (citing Leathers v. Medlock, IllS. Ct. 1438, 1444 (1991)). 
Despite New York's strenuous assertions to the contrary, the Court was adamant that the Son 
of Sam law was content-based legislation: 
/d. 
The Son of Sam law is such a content-based statute. It singles out income derived from 
expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other income, and it is directed 
only at works with a specifled content. Whether the First Amendment "speaker" is 
considered to be Henry Hill, whose income the statute places in escrow because of the 
story he has told, or Simon & Schuster, which can publish books about crime with the 
assistance of only those criminals willing to forgo remuneration for at least five years, the 
statute plainly imposes a financial disincentive only on speech of a particular content. 
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ment principles governing content neutrality in its widely publicized "hate 
speech" decision, R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul.43 The R.A. V. decision 
stands for the proposition that even when the government is regulating a 
class of speech that normally receives little or no First Amendment 
protection, the First Amendment's strict neutrality standards, which render 
presumptively unconstitutional discrimination based on content or view-
point, still apply with full force. 
The Court's opinion opens with a broad condemnation of content-
based regulation of speech, a condemnation that goes out of its way to 
repudiate the mechanical "categorical approach" associated with Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire.44 Thus, the Court in R.A. V. explained, "The First 
Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or 
even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. 
Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid. "45 
43. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992). The case involved a challenge to a St. Paul, Minnesota ordinance 
that provided: 
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, charac-
terization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, 
which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alanu or resentment 
in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct 
and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990). A minor was charged under the ordinance for 
burning a cross on an African-American family's yard. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, 
holding the St. Paul ordinance unconstitutional because it engaged in impermissible content-based and 
viewpoint-based discrimination. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547. 
44. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). There was a time when the Supreme Court appeared to embrace a 
relatively mechanieal approach to free speech doctrine, treating certain categories of speech as utterly 
outside the protection of the Constitution. The most famous exposition of this approach came in 
Clzaplinsky, in which the Court listed "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting 
or 'fighting words'" as among those classes of speech "the prevention and punishment of which have 
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem." /d. at 571-72. 
45. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (citations omitted). Significantly, the Court, repudiating the 
"categorical approach" of Chaplinsky, explained: 
From 1791 to the present, however, our society, like other free but civilized societies, has 
permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, which are "of 
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them 
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." We have recognized 
that "the freedom of speech" referred to by the First Amendment does not include a 
freedom to disregard these traditional limitations. Our decisions since the 1960's have 
narrowed the scope of the traditional categorical exceptions for defamation, and for 
obscenity, but a limited categorical approach has remained an important part of our First 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are "not within the area 
of constitutionally protected speech," or that the "protection of the First Amendment does 
not extend" to them. Such statements must be taken in context, however, and are no 
more literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity "as 
not being speech at all." What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently 
with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable 
content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not that they are categories of speech entirely 
invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for content 
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At the heart of the Court's opinion in R.A. V. was the proposition that 
the First Amendment's restrictions on content-based and viewpoint-based 
discrimination apply even when the government regulation involves a type 
of speech that, as a class, normally receives no First Amendment 
protection. Although it is constitutionally permissible, for example, to 
criminalize the distribution of obscene speech, it is not permissible to 
single out some subset of obscene speech-such as obscene speech critical 
of the government-for specially disfavored treatment.46 Similarly, while 
speech that meets the current constitutional definition of "fighting words" 
may be criminalized, it is not permissible to take one subclass of fighting 
words-such as racist fighting words-and treat that class more severely 
because of social disagreement with the racist message expressed.47 
The Court also noted that it has "upheld reasonable 'time, place, or 
manner' restrictions, but only if they are 'justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech. '"48 "And just as the power to proscribe 
particular speech on the basis of a noncontent element (e.g., noise) does 
not entail the power to proscribe the same speech on the basis of a content 
element," the Court explained, "so also, the power to proscribe it on the 
basis of one content element (e.g., obscenity) does not entail the power to 
proscribe it on the basis of other content elements. "49 
The strength of the principles articulated in R.A. V. is underscored by 
the Court's unwillingness to sustain the St. Paul ordinance on the theory 
that even if the ordinance engaged in viewpoint discrimination, the 
discrimination was justified in light of the compelling interests that 
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively prescribable content. Thus, the government 
may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination ofproscnoing 
only libel critical of the government. 
/d. at 2542-43 (citations omitted). 
46. Justice Scalia wrote: 
Our cases surely do not establish the proposition that the First Amendment imposes 
no obstacle whatsoever to regulation of particular instances of such prescribable 
expression, so that the government "may regulate [them] freely" (White, J., concurring 
in judgment). That would mean that a city council could enact an ordinance prohibiting 
only those legally obscene works that contain criticism of the city government or, indeed, 
that do not include endorsement of the city government. Such a simplistic, aU-or-nothing-
at-all approach to First Amendment protection is at odds with common sense and with our 
jurisprudence as well. 
ld. at 2543 (citation omitted). 
47. /d. at 2545. 
48. /d. at 2544 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
49. [d. (emphasis in original). Under the Court's analysis, then, "the exclusion of 'fighting words' 
from the scope of the First Amendment simply means that •.. the unprotected features of the words 
are, despite their verbal character, essentially a 'nonspeech' element of communication." [d. at 2545. 
The Court thus treated fighting words as analogous to a noisy sound truck. Both sound trucks and 
fighting words are modes of communication that can be used to convey ideas. /d. "As with the sound 
truck, however, so also with fighting words: The government may not regulate use based on hostility-
or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed." /d. 
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supported passage of the ordinance.50 St. Paul, defending its ordinance, 
argued that even if the ordinance regulates expression based on hostility 
towards its protected ideological content, this discrimination was nonethe-
less justified because it was narrowly tailored to serve compelling state 
interests. 51 
The Court responded to this argument by conceding that the state's 
interests were compelling and by conceding that the ordinance promoted 
those interests. 52 The Court held, however, that the ordinance never-
theless failed the strict scrutiny test because it was not necessary to 
accomplish the asserted interests.53 The Court stated that because there 
were adequate content-neutral alternatives available to St. Paul, the 
argument that the ordinance was necessary failed. 54 
The rules making content-based and viewpoint-based discrimination 
presumptively invalid apply to all government regulation of speech, even 
when it falls within a category such as fighting words or obscenity that 
normally receives little or no First Amendment protection. This principle 
applies to all speech, including commercial speech. In a passage that bears 
directly on the argument advanced by Collins and Skover, the Court stated: 
[A] state may choose to regulate price advertising in one industry but 
not in others, because the risk of fraud (one ofthe ch~cteristics of 
commercial speech that justifies depriving it of full First Amendment 
protection) is in its view greater there. But a State may not prohibit 
only that commercial advertising that depicts men in a demeaning 
fashion. 55 
If the poignant and incontestably compelling interests that supported 
the St. Paul ordinance-combatting race-hate and religious prejudice, and 
50. !d. at 2549. One might conceptualize this problem by posing the question of whether the First 
Amendment rule against viewpoint discrimination is conditional or absolute. If the standard governing 
viewpoint discrimination is the strict scrutiny test, the rule is merely conditional. Under the strict 
scrutiny test, laws regulating the content of speech will be upheld only when they are justified by 
compelling governmental interests and are narrowly tailored (or employ the least restrictive means) to 
effectuate those interests. See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime 
Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501, 511 (1991) (saying that the state has a compelling interest in compen-
sating victims of crime, but li~e if any interest in limiting such compensation to the proceeds of the 
wrongdoer's sP"eech about the crime); Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 131 (1989) 
(holding that a ban on indecent telephone messages violates the First Amendment because the statute's 
denial of adult access to such messages exceeds that which is necessary to serve the compelling interest 
of preventing minors from being exposed to the messages). 
51. The city argued that the ordinance helped to ensure the basic human rights of members of 
groups that historically have been subjected to discrimination, including the right of such group 
members to live in peace where they wish. R.A. V., 112 S. Ct. at 2549. 
52. [d. 
53. !d. at 2550. 
54. [d. 
55. !d. at 2546 (citations omitted). 
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encouraging racial and religious harmony and tolerance-were insufficient 
to justify a law based on content even within the general category of 
fighting words (speech that generally receives little constitutional protec-
tion), then certainly the far more ephemeral interests advanced by Collins 
and Skover cannot justify the sort of content-based regulation of commer-
cial speech they appear to contemplate. 
Commercial speech, far more than fighting words, warrants substantial 
constitutional protection. 56 And while the modem commercial speech 
standard is less demanding than "strict scrutiny," it is by no means 
flaccid. 57 The Court has on many occasions employed the standard to 
strike down government regulation of commercial speech. 58 
56. The Supreme Court set forth the current standard governing regulation of commercial speech 
in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980): 
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must 
concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must 
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and 
whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. 
ld. at 566. It would, to be sure, vastly overstate matters to claim that the pattern of Supreme Court 
decisionrnakingin contemporary commercial speech cases is as yet clear, or that the essential animating 
principles in this area are well-settled. See generally David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of 
Commercial Speech, 78 CAL. L. REv. 359, 360-61 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and 
the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1181, 1182 (1988) (both describing the 
Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment of commercial speech). 
57. The Central Hudson commercial speech test is less rigorous than the strict scrutiny level of 
judicial review normally applied to content-based regulation of speech. Under the strict scrutiny test, 
laws regulating the content of speech will he upheld only when they are justified by compelling 
governmental interests and are narrowly tailored (or employ the least restrictive means) to effectuate 
those interests. See supra notes S0-54 and accompanying text. The test for commercial speech differs 
from strict scrutiny in two ways. First, the regulation need not be justified by a compelling 
governmental interest; a substantial interest will suffice. See Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 
478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986) (cataloguing the evils created by casino gambling and concluding that Puerto 
Rico's ban on casino advertising promoted a substantial governmental interest, namely promoting the 
"health, safety, and welfare of its citizens"). Second, the means employed by the government need 
not be the least restrictive method of achieving its objective. Rather, as the Court recently explained 
in Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989): 
What our decisions require is a "'fit' between the legislature's ends and the means chosen 
to accomplish those ends," -a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that 
represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is "in proportion 
to the interest served," that employs not neeessarily the least restrictive means but, as we 
have put it in the other contexts discussed above; a means narrowly tailored to achieve 
the desired objective. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionrnakers 
to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed. 
ld. at 480 (quoting Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341 and In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)). 
58. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1990) 
(striking down a state's regulation prohibiting attorney advertising on the ground that the state's belief 
that all advertising by professionals must be inherently misleading did not constitute a sufficient basis 
to ban such advertising altogether); Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988) (.holding 
that a state may not categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business by sending truthful and 
nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face a particular legal problem); Pacific Gas & Elec. 
792 Texas Law Review [Vol. 71:777 
As I have already emphasized, mass advertising is in many respects 
more like other forms of speech in the American marketplace than unlike 
them.59 The "negative byproducts"60 that must be listed next to any 
honest ingredient description of commercial speech make it look more like 
the other genres of speech protected by the First Amendment, not less. A 
major part of modem free speech doctrine involves the emancipation of the 
ideal of freedom of speech from the requirement that the speech at issue be 
"socially constructive," or the speaker be a "contributing member of 
society." With the sole exception of the doctrines surrounding regulation 
of obscenity, 61 modem First Amendment doctrine does not require speech 
Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986) (striking down a utility commission's order 
requiring a utility to put a third party's newsletter in its billing envelopes); Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinacy Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 639-49 (1985) (striking down a state disciplinacy rule against 
soliciting or accepting legal employment through advertisements containing information and advice 
regarding a specific legal problem, and a rule banning the use of illustrations in attorney advertise-
ments); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 75 (1983) (stating that, as applied, the 
federal statute prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives is an unconstitu-
tional restriction of commercial speech); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205-07 (striking down the state's 
limitations on attorney advertising which included restrictions on the precise wording of an attorney's 
practice areas, a prohibition against identifYing the jurisdictions in which an attorney is licensed to 
practice, and restrictions on who may receive cards announcing a change of address or firm name); 
Central Hudson, 441 U.S. at 572 (striking down a regulation banning a utility from advertising to 
promote the use of electricity); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 
633-39 (1980) (holding that the village could not restrict door-to-door or on-street solicitation of 
contributions by charitable organizations to only those organizations that use at least 75% of their 
receipts for charitable purposes); First Nat' I Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978) (striking down 
a Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited specified business corporations from making contribu-
tions or expenditures "for the purpose of •.. influencing or affecting the vote on any question 
submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of 
the corporation"); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding that a disciplinacy rule prohibiting 
attorneys from advertising in newspapers or other media is unconstitutional); Carey v. Population 
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (holding that a prohibition of advertising or display of 
contraceptives was not justified on grounds that ads would be offensive and embarrassing to those 
exposed to them and that permitting such ads would legitimize sexual activity of young people); 
Linruark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1977) (holding an ordinance prohib-
iting posting of "For Sale" or "Sold" signs on residential property an unconstitutional restriction on 
dissemination of information, despite the township's perception that such signs caused white home-
owners to flee from a racially integrated community); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770-73 (1976) (stating that a ban on advertising 
prescription drug prices was not justified by the state's interest in maintaining the professionalism of 
licensed pharmacists); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 825-29 (1975) (concluding that a paid 
commercial advertisement in a newspaper was protected by the First Amendment and overturning the 
conviction of a newspaper editor for encouraging or prompting an abortion through the sale of a 
publication). 
59. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
60. By "negative byproducts" I mean the types of shortcomings documented so well by Collins 
and Skover: appeals to vanity or emotion and the use of exaggeration, hyperbole, and imaging to 
influence the reader or listener. 
61. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15 (1973). In Miller the Court announced a new test governing obscenity, stating that the basic guide-
lines for the trier of fact must be: 
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to demonstrate any redeeming social value as a predicate to its protection. 
Rather than require speech to have redeeming social value to qualify 
for First Amendment protection, our society protects a great deal that has 
little or no plausible social value in the eyes of many. Indeed, the things 
that most bother Collins and Skover about mass advertising are also things 
that characterize much of the speech in American mass culture. Whether 
Americans are talking about sex or politics (or both together), for example, 
our discourse is often not discourse at all, but rather fantasy and sound 
bite. 
Vast quantities of the speech in the modem American marketplace 
consist of symbol, image, and fantasy. For example, the billion-dollar 
marketplace for pornographic speech (by which I mean speech that appeals 
to the prurient interest in sex but fails to meet the stringent First Amend-
ment definition of "obscenity") is largely a trade in sexual fantasy. While 
we do permit this type of pornographic but not obscene speech to be kept 
off the airwaves, current First Amendment doctrine does not permit such 
speech to be banned in print media. 62 
Similarly, a great deal of our political discourse is vacuous and 
fantastical. Politics is now often reduced to slogan and sound bite. 
(Message: "Change.") (Message: "Trust.") There may or may not be a 
core of creative thought or hard analytic content underlying these surface 
political slogans. A candidate may have well-reasoned position papers and 
action plans that document his or her claim that trust or change is in order. 
Or a candidate may be debasing the currency of words by using them "not 
to convey meaning but as audible confetti. "63 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary communicy standards" would 
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 
the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious 
literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 
ld. at 24 (citations omitted). In Pope v. lllinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987), the Supreme Court refined the 
Miller test, explaining that the redeeming literary, artistic, political, or scientific value test is not to be 
determined by reference to local communicy standards, but rather according to a "reasonable person" 
standard. Id. at 500.04. 
62. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding the FCC's power to sanction 
indecent, although not obscene, speech in the context of broadcasting). 
63. George F. Will, 'A Figure of Genuine Pathos,' WASH. Posr, July 29, 1992, at A23. George 
Will used this phrase as part of an attack on President Bush, suggesting that Bush withdraw from the 
presidential race. He argued: 
I d. 
That is why the Bush campaign, like Bush himself, uses words not to convey meaning but 
as audible confetti. For example, when Ross Perot was a threat, Bush's people 
eviscerated him as emotionally unstable, anti-constitutional, a potential cyrant and actual 
ignoramus. When Perot withdrew, Bush's people promptly praised him as "wise" and 
"courageous." To them, words mean nothing because nothing means anything-nothing, 
that is except power or, more precisely, office. They do not even have the gravicy that 
comes from craving power to effect change. 
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It is extremely difficult, however, to account for all the historical 
forces within a culture that create our sound-bite mentality. To argue that 
our political language has degenerated into sound-bite imagery because 
modem mass advertising has caused us to think in fifteen-second bursts 
dominated by image flashes and fantasy is a fascinating hypothesis, M but 
not a particularly persuasive demonstration of cause and effect. I have no 
doubt that the beat and style of modem mass advertising has had its 
influence on politics. But politics has also influenced advertising, and the 
criss-crossing causal currents are fluid and difficult to chart. 65 
To some degree, in both politics and commerce, the voter and 
consumer get the marketplace they deserve.66 The candidacy of Ross 
Perot is said to have tapped into a well of frustration with contemporary 
politics. But this frustration is often vague and inarticulate, and may 
reflect habits of mind on the part of some voters that encourage sound bites 
and slogans. Rather than think through the details of public policy and 
face hard political choices, many voters may be only too happy to whine 
about government and grasp whatever trendy platitudes come along. 67 
ill. "Commodification" and the Transforming Power of Modem Mass 
Advertising: Are We the Sum of What We Buy? 
The indictment against contemporary mass advertising is ultimately 
distilled by Collins and Skover into what I regard as their most daring 
hypothesis. Modem advertising does not simply attempt to convince us to 
buy products. It does not simply act upon consumers by attempting to 
persuade them or even seduce them. Modem advertising, rather, seeks to 
create the buyer, using imagery and fantasy to actually constitute the 
64. See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 725-26. 
65. The pacing of all modern life is now frenetic. The reduction of many television commercials 
from one minute to 15 seconds has created an entirely new visual syntax. 
66. As Lewis H. Lapham recently wrote: 
Ask any American what money means, and nine times in ten he or she will say that 
it is synonymous with freedom, that it opens the doors to feeling and experience ...• 
No matter what their income, a depressing number of Americans believe that if only they 
had twice as much money, they would inherit the state of happiness promised them by the 
Declaration of Independence. 
Lewis H. Lapham, Captain Money, HARPERS, Aug. 1992, at 7, 7. 
67. Joseph Mianowany, chief political writer for United Press International, assessed Ross Perot's 
presidential candidacy along these lines. Mianowany wrote: 
The sad part is that even while they decry sound-bite politics, too many Americans simply 
don't want to be bothered spending the time and energy to go beyond the sound bites. 
It's much easier to simply complain about the system. That way, you can sound 
intelligent and concerned without having to make any hard choices. 
What voters don't seem to understand is that as long as they refuse to dirty their 
hands with details, the politicians won't do so either. 
Joseph Mianowany, .•• And Voters Begging to Be Suckered, WASH. PoST, June 20, 1992, at A15. 
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consumer,68 who will then, of course, remain loyal to the creator. 
I cannot accept that we are "largely the sum of what we buy. "69 
Concededly, we may, in a limited and figurative sense, be the sum of what 
we buy into, including our "investments" in fantasy. But the mere fact that 
the commercial marketplace is filled with images calculated to aggrandize 
our fantasies does not mean we are ourselves transformed into fantastical 
beings. 
A. From Information to Image and Lifestyle 
Collins and Skover challenge us to "get real" in our assessment of 
modern commercial speech policies, provocatively demonstrating that 
modern mass advertising is dominated by the marketing of image and 
lifestyle, rather than information about products and services.70 They 
describe a quainter era in the early days of mass marketing in which 
advertising was largely concerned with functional information about the 
design and utility of products. 71 After the 1920s, this style of advertising 
began to give way to "product-image" advertising, in which commodities 
were placed in natural settings or landscapes, and to the "personification" 
of products, giving them human or animal characteristics so that a perfume 
could itself be sexy, or a gas pump could put a tiger in your tank.n 
There was a certain Darwinian inevitability to this evolution, wrapped 
up in the very nature of the mass production of similar goods; for when 
brand image is the only distinctive feature of a product, there is not much 
to sell other than image. 73 Thus, commercial speech today is largely a 
free trade in images, rather than ideas. Mass advertising encodes goods 
and services with symbolic meanings, meanings that speak more to the 
lifestyle of the consumer than the attributes of the product.74 
More significantly, whereas there was once a time when the huckster 
might try to sell the consumer on the fantastical qualities of the product-
the miracle hair-restorer sold by the carnival con man would not only cure 
baldness but everything from arthritis to an ingrown toenail-today 
Madison Avenue attempts to sell fantasies about the consumer.15 
68. See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 716. 
69. /d. at 698. 
70. See id. at 704, 709-10. 
71. /d. at 700-02. 
72. /d. at 702 (citing ROLAND MARCHAND, ADVERTISING THE AMERICAN DREAM: MAKINO WAY 
FOR MODERNITY 1920-1940, at 358 {1985)). 
73. See id. at 704 (quoting LEO BOGART, STRATEGY IN ADVERTISING 5 (2d ed. 1990) and 
CHARLES GOODRUM & HELEN DALRYMPLE, ADVERTISING IN AMERICA: THE FIRST 200 YEARS 45 
(1990)). 
74. /d. at 700. 
75. /d. at 708. 
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B. Assessing the Impact of Image Advertising 
All of us, all the time, are invited by modem advertising to imagine 
that we are something we are not. We are cajoled to imagine ourselves as 
more sexy or chic or athletic or smart or rich than we really are, and to 
consume accordingly. The menu of potential fantasies is almost limitless. 
Products thus become fantasy-facilitators. But does this marketing of 
fantasy actually alter self-identity? 
The sheer quantity and volume of mass advertising might lead us to 
believe that it cannot help but transform us. Calling it a "junkyard of 
commodity ideology," Collins and Skover well document its ubiquity.76 
Every day, we are told, 
[T]welve billion display ads, two and one-half million radio commer-
cials, and over three hundred thousand television commercials are 
dumped into the collective consciousness. Advertising consumes 
almost "sixty percent of newspaper space, 52 percent of magazine 
pages, 18 percent of radio time, [and] 17 percent of network 
television prime time. "77 
The choice of the terms "dumped" and "consumes" are telling. Are they 
apt? 
It is certainly true that our "collective consciousness" is exposed to a 
massive bombardment of commercial messages each day: But are these 
messages "dumped" into our consciousness in a more meaningful sense, 
consuming valuable intellectual space, taking up pages in newspapers or 
magazines that would be better devoted to other speech, or what is worse, 
cluttering our brains like unwanted megabytes eating the memory space on 
our computer disk drives? 
Collins and Skover argue that these messages really do influence us, 
indeed actually transform us in deep and significant ways.78 One of 
Collins and Skover's most powerful insights is that advertising agencies 
now sell audiences to manufacturers, rather than products for 
manufacturers.79 Advertisers, indeed, do not merely use demographics 
and psychographies to identify the particular consumer preferences of 
different target audiences among consumers. Rather, advertisers use these 
tools to "sell" to the manufacturer a discrete pre-existing audience that will 
be predisposed to like a product, as well as to design an ad campaign that 
76. /d. at 707. 
77. /d. at 707 (citing LEO BOGART, STRATEGY IN ADVERTISING 1-2 (2d ed. 1990); quoting Leo 
Bogart, The American Media System and Its Commercial Culture, GANNE'IT FOUNDATION OCCASIONAL 
PAPER No. 8, at 6 (Mar. 1991) (Gannett Foundation Media Center, New York, NY)) (emphasis added). 
78. See id. at section I(C)(2). 
79. /d. at 704. 
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will appeal to the identified audience. 80 The advertising agency actually 
attempts to create the audience by encouraging a group identity and by 
instilling in the audience a set of group fantasies that comprise, if you will, 
the particular sect's consumer religion. 
This argument is ingenious but not convincing. Sixty percent of the 
newspaper space may be filled with advertising, but that advertising does 
not command sixty percent of the average reader's attention. We are 
inured to most of these advertisements and commercials; they wash over 
us without even dampening the skin. We often do not stop to even read 
or watch the ads at all, and when we do, they rarely penetrate or connect 
with our consciousness, let alone transform our identity. True, we are all 
persuaded and seduced from time to time by these ads, encouraged to make 
irrational or impulsive consumer choices. But that kind of persuasion and 
seduction is endemic to social life; we run across it constantly and develop 
mechanisms to filter it out and fend it off. 
Commercials are not the only junk food in the speech market-indeed, 
when compared to shallow news reporting, vacuous television shows, or 
political doubles peak, commercials are not even the most harmful to mental 
health. If consumers consume too much intellectual junk food, the onus 
should be on consumers to change their diets. No one must watch the 
television commercial to view the show-though admittedly it is inconve-
nient to avoid it-and certainly no one must pay attention. Newspapers and 
magazines cost the same whether or not the advertisements are read. How-
ever, newspapers and magazines would not exist without advertising. 81 
C. Taking into Account the Multidimensional Aspects of Modem 
Advertising 
The Collins and Skover portrait of modem lifestyle advertising is 
realistic in the sense that it accurately describes one highly prevalent mode 
of contemporary advertising. The portrait ought not be understood as an 
accurate depiction of the entire landscape. Nor is that landscape as 
threatening as Collins and Skover make out. 
That advertisers sell audiences to manufacturers, for example, is 
interesting, but not necessarily dangerous. The segmented marketplace is 
not itself an intrinsic evil. Using psychographies, that evolutionary 
advance on demographics, advertisers are able to aim their pitches at 
80. See id. at 704-{)6. 
81. American newspapers have been facing an economic mini-crisis in recent years, attempting 
to cope with serious declines in advertising revenue. This problem was the principal focus of the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association annual convention in Vancouver in 1991. See generally 
Looking for a Break in the Overcast Sides, PREssTIME, June 1991, at 28, 28. 
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customized markets. 82 But this is only natural-of course advertisers want 
to advertise in places likely to be effective, and of course the content of the 
magazine, newspaper, or television show will be linked to the nature of the 
product. Indeed, one of the competitive problems for newspapers is that 
they are not easily adapted to this form of targeting. Whereas advertisers 
can rather easily link a particular product to a television show's viewer 
profile or to a magazine's readership, the traditional "great metropolitan 
newspaper" is distributed across a large and relatively undifferentiated 
audience. 83 
To the extent that there are legitimate fears arising from this form of 
targeted advertising, they are not global but specific. It ought to be an 
elemental ethical norm, for example, that the news and editorial content of 
serious news organizations not be influenced by advertisers. It is one thing 
to place sporting goods ads in the sports pages, and another to pull the 
punches in a critique of the safety of some new sporting fad to pacify the 
local sporting goods store. Additionally, pockets do exist within the 
marketplace where legal regulation of advertising that would otherwise run 
afoul of the First Amendment may be legitimate, such as advertising 
directed at children. 84 
On balance, however, the image of modem advertising conveyed by 
Collins and Skover expands reality to the same extent as much of the 
advertising they chastise. Old-fashioned product-information advertising, 
for example, has not gone entirely out of fashion. The advertisements for 
"new technology" equipment, such as personal computers, 85 fax 
82. Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 706. 
83. See Schenner Outlines How Newspapers Can Be Reinvented, PR.EssTIME, June 1991, at 30, 
30. 
84. First Amendment doctrines protective of speech are in some circumstances relaxed when the 
speech at issue poses a special danger to children because the paternalism that is normally an anathema 
to First Amendment jurisprudence is deemed appropriate for the teaching and sheltering of children. 
For example, the Court's controversial ruling in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), 
is grounded largely in the perceived pervasiveness of broadcasting and the dangers posed by vulgar 
broadcasting to children. For a further discussion of my views on Pacifica, including my criticisms, 
see RODNEY A. SMOLLA, JERRY FALWELL V. LARRY FLYNT: THE FIRST AMENDMENT ON TRIAL 195-
201 (1988). See also Osbornev. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108-11 (1990) (holding that Ohio may proscribe 
the possession and viewing of child pornography); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 
276 (1988) (permitting educators editorial control over the contents of a school-sponsored, student-run 
newspaper); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 680-86 (1986) (permitting school 
officials to regulate lewd speech by students at a school assembly); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
750 (1982) (allowing New York to "criminalize[] •.. the use of a child in a sexual performance"). 
85. A typical personal computer advertisement will, for example, be dominated by technical 
information, often intertwined with subjective characterization of the product's performance. For 
example, a current ad for a laptop computer describea the screen as "bright and crisp" in the same 
paragraph in which technical information is conveyed: 
The backlit, 10-inch VGA ••• screens are bright and crisp. Resolution is 640 X 480, 
64 gray scale, on the LCD. With ••• video RAM, you can also display 1024 X 768 
resolution on a monitor display simultaneousiy. 
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machines, 86 or stereo components, 87 are heavily product-information 
oriented. For many of these products, basic functional attributes and 
technical capabilities of the machines being sold remain the dominant 
elements in the advertising content. 
Similarly, mundane classified ads in newspapers remain an important 
part of the contemporary commercial speech universe, accounting for 
nearly one-third of the advertising revenue for newspapers.88 Indeed, 
newspaper advertising revenue remains highly information bound, 
delivering pricing information on sales in department stores or grocery 
stores for many of the products that are pitched through mass market 
advertising in other media. 
Furthermore, much of what at first blush appears to be pure 
"lifestyle" advertising may have more straightforward informational content 
than we might at first acknowledge. Women's magazines, for example, are 
thick with advertising for fashion, cosmetics, and perfumes. It is hard to 
sell a fragrance without using suggestive imagery, so fragrance advertisers 
can hardly be blamed for not always dealing in hard information. 
Fragrance manufacturers often do, however, provide magazine readers with 
the best possible consumer information-in the form of a fragrance sampler 
(not a "snifter" but a "sniffer," I would say) that can be sniffed to find out 
exactly how the product smells. Cosmetics and clothing advertisements 
also convey important information in their content, demonstrating what the 
product looks like-which for those products is what matters most. To be 
sure, a lot of fantasy is being sold in these ads, but we ought to be 
PC WORLD, June 1992, at 64 (Gateway 2000 advertisement). 
86. A recent advertisement for a new variation on fax machine technology, for example, explains 
the product's function to consumers in addition to conveying technical data: 
With [the product], you'll never waste your valuable time working for your fax machine. 
Let's say you're in New York. And your PC is in L.A. With [the product], you don't 
have to touch or even be near your PC to get and distribute or retrieve a document. 
Using a specially encoded .•• form, you simply check a few boxes. Fax the form back 
to your PC and it distributes everything for you. Automatically. 
PC WORLD, June 1992, at 83 (Xerox advertisement). 
87. The advertising copy for a stereo speaker currently on the market, for example, contains the 
following paragraph: 
The [speaker] measures 39 inches high, 17 inches wide, and 12 inches deep, and each 
speaker weighs 45 pounds. The rated system sensitivity is 90 dB sound-pressure level 
(SPL) at 1 meter with 2.83 volts of full-band pink-noise input, and its nominal impedance 
is 6 to 8 ohms. The usable power-input range is specified as 5 to 400 watts. The 
fw!uency response (nonanechoic) is given as 24 to 18,000 Hz ± 3 dB (this appears to 
be the summed output from the two speakers with the microphone on the center listening 
axis). 
(copy on file with the Teras Law Review). 
88. See Ad Spending Drops, PREssTIME, June 1991, at 70, 70 (reporting that expenditures for U.S. 
daily newspaper advertising in the first quarter of 1991 totalled $6.8 billion, $2.3 billion of which was 
for classifieds). 
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circumspect in condemning them as nothing but fantasy. There is often a 
great deal of useful information in them, and "information credit" should 
be given where credit is due. Thus "lifestyle" advertising is certainly a 
significant, and maybe even the dominant, part of modern advertising, but 
by no means is it the only contemporary advertising style. 89 
The instant one recognizes (as Collins and Skover do) that modern 
advertising is multidimensional, the task of designing coherent First 
Amendment policies for such advertising becomes problematic. For the 
question posed is not, "What should we make of modern commercial 
speech doctrines in light of the fact that it is primarily comprised of the 
selling of fantasy?" but rather, "What should we make of modern 
commercial speech doctrines in light of the fact that it is partly comprised 
of the selling of fantasy?" This is an important distinction because it 
illustrates one of the greatest perils of attempting to regulate commercial 
speech with legal rules-indeed, of attempting to regulate any genre of 
speech. Precisely because speech is so often "a combination-of-ingredients 
product" (to demonstrate how much my own discourse is filled with the 
jingles of commercialism), it is extremely difficult to regulate speech on the 
basis of the characteristics of any one communicative strain. Thus, even 
if the packaging of fantasies in connection with the sale of a stereo system 
(Message: "This stereo system will make your nights at home more 
romantic.") were somehow worthy of less First Amendment dignity than 
technical information on the attributes of the stereo system (Message: "The 
rated system sensitivity is 90 dB sound-pressure level (SPL) at 1 meter 
with 2.83 volts of full-band pink-noise input, and its nominal impedance 
is 6 to 8 ohms."), it does not follow that we could very easily regulate one 
without regulating the other unless we are willing to engage in forms of 
regulation more oppressive and heavy-handed than most people would 
tolerate in an open society. Even when dealing with commercial speech, 
it must be remembered that the government bears the burden of proving 
that the regulation it has imposed is justified and that it has crafted its 
regulation so as to separate "the harmless from the harmful. "90 
89. Collins and Skover do give advertising its due in this respect, admitting: 
Advertising today need not be one-dimensional. To a greater or lesser degree, it may tap 
into all the historical marketing formats: information, image, personality and lifestyle 
advertising. The choice or mix of advertising forms depends on the intended audience, 
the product or service type, the social context for use, and the advertising medium 
employed. 
Collins & Skover, supra note I, at 706. 
90. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (quoting Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 
486 U.S. 466, 478 (1988) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 
(1985))). 
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IV. Conclusion: A Nonscientific Thought Experiment 
The ideas advanced by Collins and Skover are fresh and provocative. 
Their excellent essay is as lively and catchy as even the best fare of 
modern mass advertising. And, as I have already conceded, they are 
certainly under no obligation to accept any of the assumptions underlying 
contemporary commercial speech jurisprudence. 91 
Stuck, however, with the existence of the First Amendment, they are, 
at least in the practical world oflegal doctrine and precedent, bound by the 
First Amendment principle placing the burden of persuasion upon those 
who presume to regulate expression-even commercial expression-a 
burden that requires the would-be regulator to demonstrate that the 
regulation is warranted. 92 
The assertion that image advertising causes significant individual harm 
is not only unsupported by any solid evidence, but it also runs contrary to 
the everyday experience of consumers. The argument is arresting and 
intriguing, but is it real, or is it just one of those beguiling arguments that 
sounds good but is not grounded in reality? My intuition is quite the 
opposite of Collins and Skover's; indeed, I have the nagging sense that the 
argument that mass advertising really sinks in and hurts us suffers from 
much the same nonlinear and nonlogical argument techniques that Collins 
and Skover so criticize.93 It strikes me as highly implausible that people 
really regard themselves, or those around them, as profoundly transformed 
by modern advertising. That most people do not regard themselves as 
terminally gullible does not prove, of course, that they are right-an entire 
culture may be duped-but it certainly raises the ante of skepticism. 94 
91. See supra text accompanying note 37. 
92. AI; the Supreme Court has emphasized, "the free flow of commercial information is valuable 
enough to justify imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing ... the harmless from 
the harmful." Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (quoting Shapero, 486 U.S. at 478 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. 
at 646)); see also supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
93. See Collins & Skover, supra note 1, at 712 (arguing that "[t]his kind of thinking-which 
accepts proof that is not proof-is an essential intellectual factor in our economy" (quoting JULES 
HENRY, CULTURE AGAINST MAN 48 (1963)) (emphasis in original)). My rejoinder to this passage is 
that this kind of thinking is a factor in our economy, but hardly the dominant or essential factor, and 
that if it is, the authors need to offer more in the way of proof. They document very persuasively that 
we are invited by commercials to think in nonlinear, nonlogical ways, but they do not document that 
these commercials actually cause us to think this way-at least in comparison to the ststic level of 
illogical thought and bebavior that is common to most humans. Perhaps their "proof' is that the 
products pushed by these advertisers actually sell, and that these purchases are, on balance, not "good 
buys." But they have a long way to go to document that sweeping proposition, for certainly there are 
quality goods and services sold in the American economy, some of which may be touted through image 
and lifestyle advertising. 
94. Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey speak to this point: 
This preference for practical belief over grand deduction seems especially appropriate in 
legal theory. Lest it lose its vital human component, law must be concerned not only with 
the applicability of legal rules, but also their appropriateness in particular circumstances. 
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Let me use, as a case for thought experiment, one of the advertising 
lines now used by Gatorade in commercials featuring the Chicago Bulls' 
basketball superstar, Michael Jordan: 
Like Mike! 
If I could be like Mike! 
I select this example because I can offer a first-hand account of its effect 
upon me by sharing my own fantasies.95 For indeed, if I could be like 
Mike and play for the Chicago Bulls, I would 4rink Gatorade every day.96 
I am not convinced that either for me or the kids of the world, these 
invitations to fantasy cause much palpable harm. If we are to "get real" 
in assessing modern advertising and First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech, <n let's really get real and have the proponents of 
regulation make the case with the genuine evidence and convincing 
argument that it is really needed. 
What harm to the consumer does this fantasizing do? Who is hurt? 
Who is "created" or "reconstituted" or "debased" or "commodified"? Are 
the Nike basketball shoes I buy being turned into religious fetishes?98 I 
Moreover, legal outcomes cannot survive if they are incompatible with the webs of belief 
of the community in general and the legal community in particular. 
Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REv. 
1615, 1643 (1987). 
95. This first-hand account, of course, is simply subjective anecdotal evidence. I offer it, 
however, with an invitation to readers to check it against their own experience. I have asked my 
colleagues and friends about the amount of advertising they "consume" and how it affects them. Does 
advertising cause them to think differently of themselves? To make irrational purchases? To speak 
and write in ways that lose any grounding in reality or logic? Have they found cultural symbols 
debased and trivialized? 
My nonscientific polling indicates that many people have much the same complaints as Collins 
and Skover about many of the excesses of mass media advertising; I share most of those concerns 
myself. And most people concede that mass advertising does have some negative influence upon them 
and encourages some irrational purchases. Most people, however, profess to have relatively strong 
advertising immune systems and do not feel that they are being transformed in any alarming sense. 
These testimonials· are hardly scientific proof, but they certainly raise suspicion about the inherent 
plausibility of the strong indictment against mass advertising and demonstrate the problem with the 
paucity of causal proof that pervades that indictment. 
96. Gatorade advertisements clearly encourage some of us to imagine that we really could be like 
Mike. If they have this affect on me, a 39-year-old pick-up player with only a slim chance (less, I 
admit, than 30 percent) of someday making the roster of the Chicago Bulls, think how they must affect 
the millions of kids out there, still filled with the limitless promise of American life, swelled with the 
hopes that live eternal within the human breast. 
97. See supra text accompanying note 70. 
98. Nike is another manufacturer that employs the Michael Jordan fantasy in its advertising and 
I am here to testify that it has not hurt me. I get pleasure from these impish dreams. Is that so evil? 
For a few fieeting moments, an image of Michael Jordan flashes across my stream of consciousness 
as I tie my shoes, along with something I wish I had said to a colleague during our most recent faculty 
meeting, and a flash reminder of what 1 need to pick up at the grocery store after playing, and a 
thought to be sure to stop at the bank first, and scores of other broken-syntax images that flutter 
through my head in these occasional precious respites from the pace of professional life. Sure, the 
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will concede that these advertisements influence me to consume, and all too 
often to consume extravagantly, and what is far worse, particularly in light 
of the stresses we are placing on the environment, to consume wastefully. 
Like many others, I buy more things than I really need-often, I admit, 
because these material things give me a fleeting sense of well-being.99 I 
am not, however, a narrow-minded materialist, stripped of all spirituality, 
poetry, or meaningful interpersonal relationships in my life. So what if I 
enjoy a little dreaming now and then, even when prompted by my athletic 
shoes? At worst, I go out and get some exercise-encouraged, of course, 
to "Just do it!" Many forces in this world combine to influence our 
personas, and modem mass advertising certainly is among them, but its 
pernicious influence on the making of any specific individual, if it could 
ever be documented at all, would surely prove infinitesimal. 
Even more fundamentally, debate over the harm caused by the 
fantastical nuances of a Nike ad positively pales in significance by 
comparison to debate over the actual social and economic problems posed 
by Nike's entire enterprise. It is true, Nike does profit from advertising. 
It is a consistently profitable company, with over three billion dollars in 
gross sales in 1991, $200 million of which Nike attributes to the 
endorsements of Michael Jordan.100 Nike's 1991 net profit was $287 
million.101 However, rather than attempt to regulate the content of Nike 
advertising, governments ought to tackle the far more intractable issues 
posed by the economics of how multinational corporations do business in 
the world market. In 1980, for example, Nike closed its last footwear 
factory in the United States, in Saco, Maine, relocating most of its factories 
in nations such as South Korea and Indonesia, where labor costs are 
dramatically cheaper. 102 In the Sung H wa factory in Tangerang, outside 
of Jakarta, Indonesia, one factory worker earns 2100 Indonesia rupiah, or 
$1.03 per day, for her labor in a Nike factory, which is less than the 
image of Michael flashed by-but give me a break! I did not think I really was Mike. I did not really 
think I could be Mike. I didn't really think I could be like Mike, in any sense that you could call 
delusional. I have not lost touch with all reality. And having spent a lot of time on a lot of different 
basketball courts with a lot of nine-year-olds who, I am sure, share many of my basketball fantasy 
impulses, I am willing to venture with confidence that the millions of youthful Nike consumers out in 
the world have not lost sight of reality either. 
99. And I will at times hum the words to Madonna's song, singing to myself, "We are living in 
a material world, and I am a material girl." MADONNA, Material Girl, on LIKE A VIRGIN (Sire 
Records 1984). The words are catchy and capture a bit of guilty truth. 
100. See Jeffrey Ballinger, The New Free-Trade Heel: Nike's Profits Jump on the Backs of Asian 
Workers, HARPER's, Aug. 1992, at 46, 46. 
101. Id. 
102. See id. In the late 1980s, when South Korean workers gained the right to organize unions 
and strike, they demanded higher wages, which a~ into Nike's profits. Nike then established new 
factories in countries such as Indonesia. Id. 
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Indonesian government's figure for "minimum physical need. "103 The 
labor cost to manufacture a pair of Nikes that sells for eighty dollars in the 
United States is approximately twelve cents.104 
The appropriate social response to these realities, none of which 
appear in Nike ads, is complex. Perhaps the hot engine Of Nike 
advertising and its use of a world labor pool and a world sales market have 
the effect of encouraging free world trade, and thus worldwide 
industrialization and development. Perhaps Nike's presence is good for 
Tangerang, Indonesia, even if bad for Saco, Maine. But perhaps, also, it 
ought to be incumbent upon Nike to pay a living wage to its workers in 
Indonesia, and perhaps American trade policy should be calibrated to 
require that. These are social and economic issues in which the question 
of whether the market should be regulated or free is fairly joined. These 
are social and economic issues that need to be addressed and solved. 
These are the types of realities upon which public discourse ought to focus 
its ever-shortening attention span. 
103. /d. at 46-47. 
104. /d. at 47. 
